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SPILLING OIL MAY BE HAZARDOUS
TO YOUR WEALTH
The federal government, pursuant to Section 1321 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, has compre-
hensive powers regarding the discharge of oil and other hazardous
substances. Penalties and clean up expenses are provided for in
detail. A cooperative federal attitude is expressed in the statute to
encourage state participation in oil discharge cleanup and preven-
tion.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is dependent upon oil more than any other
natural resource. But during the process of extraction and in the
course of distribution, oil and its products are exposed to various
hazards, potentially causing accidental discharges.1 Landmark acci-
dents involving oil development or transportation include the Torrey
Canyon disaster,2 the Santa Barbara oil spill,' and the San Francisco
oil spill of 1971.' An estimated 10,000 spills of oil and other
hazardous substances annually pollute the navigable waters of the
United States.' The problem is most acute in the coastal regions
where massive long term devastation can be the most damaging,
although inland regions have also been the victims of oil spills.
Though oil may be spilled, it may also be cleaned up as technology
has been developed to deal effectively with the problem.6 These
techniques are costly and are not totally environmentally effective.'
In order to deal more effectively with the constant threat of oil
pollution in the waters of the United States, the Secretary of the
1. With domestic supplies diminishing, it follows that the United States as well as other
industrialized nations will depend primarily on foreign oil sources resulting in increased oil
transport, W. MARX, OILSPILL 14 (1971).
2. See E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER, THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).
3. See A. NASH, D. MANN & P. OLSEN, OIL POLLUTION AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: A STUDY OF THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL (1972).
4. See Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries House
of Representatives, H.R. Serial No. 92-3, 92d cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
5. 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 3.01, 3-15 (Bender 1973).
6. D. BOESCH, C. HERSHNER & J. MILGRAM, OIL SPILLS AND THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT 57 (1974); S. DEGLER, OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
31(1969).
7. Ia
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Interior in 1969 recommended to the President that legislation be
drafted to meet this national problem.8 Oil pollution control legisla-
tion is not, however, a product of recent times. The first statute
judicially interpreted as dealing with oil discharges was the Refuse
Act of 1899 (Refuse Act)9 which defined "refuse" to include oil.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1924 (1924 Act)" ° specifically dealt with
oil discharges of vessels and was enacted to protect coastal waters.
Congress next passed the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act;' ' and
in 1965 it enacted the Water Quality Act which established water
quality standards for interstate waters.' 2 The Clean Water Restora-
tion Act of 1966 (1966 Act)'" amended the 1924 Act. The 1966
Act was superceded by the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970
(1970 Act); 1" an even more comprehensive statute. The 1970 Act,
as amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (FWPCAA),' ' in particular section 1321,' 6 which
deals with oil and hazardous substance discharge liability, is the sub-
ject matter of this comment.' I The FWPCAA adopts the same
measure of damages as the 1924 Act; however, the defenses are more
limited, reflecting a strict liability standard rather than a negligence
standard.
8. Id. at 62.
9. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, c. 425, § §13, 16, 30 Stat. 1152, 1153 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § §407, 411 (1899)) defined refuse to include oil.
10. Acts of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, § § 1 to 5, 7, 8, 43 Stat. 604-606 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§431-437 (1924); Pub. L. No. 19-224, Title I, §108, 84 Stat. 113 (repealed
1970)).
11. Water Pollution and Control Act of 1948, c. 758 62 Stat. 1155 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 4 66-4 66(g) (1948)), as amended and renumbered by Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91
(1970).
12. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§1151 (1965)).
13. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § §431-437, 466a, 466c-1 to 4 66g, 466j, 4661-466n (1966)).
14. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, title 1, 101-107,
109-112, 84 Stat. 91 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970)).
15. Unless otherwise noted, all citations in the text are to section numbers (primarily
§ 1321) of the session law, Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972. Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1251 (Supp. 11 1972)).
16. Id §1321, as amended by, Pub. L. No. 93-207 §1, 87 Stat. 906 (1973); Pub. L. No.
95-217, §2, 4-72, 91 Stat. 1566-1609 (1977). Extensive legislative history as it relates
specifically to this section is sparse and ambiguous and, therefore, will not be referenced
exhaustively. For a complete legislative history of the FWPCAA see Committee on Public
Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (2 vol. 1973).
17. This comment will not address the myriad of causes of action based upon admiraltyjurisdiction and the common law theories of liability which may arise subsequent to an oil
discharge, such as: nuisance, unseaworthiness, negligence, trespass, etc.; nor will the case law
be discussed regarding the applicability of other federal statutes such as the Refuse Act of
1899. For a helpful, short outline of these additional theories of liability, see T. POST,
PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DISCHARGE OF OIL
FROM VESSELS ON THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES, 23 (1972).
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In reaffirming the objective contemplated by the Refuse Act, Con-
gress in enacting the FWPCAA stated that "without a clearly set goal
of natural water quality achieved through application of a no-dis-
charge policy, it is not likely that resources will be applied to develop
the means necessary to achieve an environmentally and ecologically
sound water quality goal." 1 8 The objective of the FWPCAA is to
restore and maintain the natural, chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters.1 9 In its legislative proviso,2 0 Con-
gress stated that "it is the policy of the United States that there
should be no discharge of oil or hazardous substances into or upon
the navigable waters2 of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or
into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone." The FWPCAA also
visualizes a goal of the elimination of all polluting discharges by
1985.2 2 As Congress conceived it, the purpose of this federal legisla-
tion is to prevent harmful spills and minimize the damage caused by
such spills. 2
MAJOR PENALTY PROVISIONS
Section 1321 of the FWPCAA (Section) 2" is physically divided
into eighteen subsections which are assembled primarily to effectuate
the efficient, effective cleanup of oil and hazardous substances and,
secondarily, to provide a systematic framework for penalty imposi-
tion. The primary emphasis of this paper is placed upon subsections
(b), (c), (f), (i), and (o), and their interconnections with each other
and the seemingly minor subsections.
Subsection (b) outlines not only the Section's declaration of
policy, but also provides a mechanism for the designation of
hazardous substances, assesses penalties upon a finding of non-
removeability, assesses liability for the discharge of oil or hazardous
substances in harmful quantities, provides for the designation of
harmful quantities, provides for prompt notification procedures with
criminal sanctions, and provides a civil penalty subject to com-
promise by the Coast Guard. Unquestionably, this subsection is the
18. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Reprinted in [1972], U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3678.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1978).
20. lId §1321(b)(1).
21. When the FWPCAA refers to "navigable waters" this has not been interpreted to
mean the "classical navigable waters" concept, but to all waters of the United States. See
Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Leslie Salt Co. v.
Froehike, 403 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665, 671 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 364
F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
22. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) (1978).
23. United States v. Le Beouf Bros. Towing Co., 537 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1976).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1978).
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foundation upon which federal oil pollution cleanup liability is built.
It does not, however, proscribe who shall be liable for cleanup
responsibility and expenses. Subsequent provisions provide for these
responsibilities." This subsection has been the most proficiently
litigated subsection of all the subsections combined.
The vital issues addressed by this subsection may be summarized
as follows: it provides for the penalties to be assessed if it is found
that certain elements and compounds designated as hazardous sub-
stances cannot be removed from water;2 6 it establishes the discharge
levels for oil and hazardous substances in harmful quantities;2 7 it
establishes whose responsibility it is for notifying the appropriate
agency 2" of a harmful discharge; 2" and it delimits the civil penalty
provisions of the subsection.3 0
The Section provides for liability not only for the discharge of oil
based substances but also for the discharge of non-oil based sub-
stances. 3 1 Since oil based or similarly chemically structured com-
pounds do not mix with water, and therefore can be removed from
water if done expeditiously, provision had to be made to account for
those substances that would be impossible to remove from water.3 2
The Section directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Administrator) to determine which hazardous sub-
stances can be removed. 3 3 A discharge of non-removable hazardous
substances will result in liability pursuant to a two-tier penalty pro-
vision,3 subject to any appropriate defenses.3 ' These penalties are
totally discretionary with the Administrator. The first penalty alter-
native is based upon a finding of toxicity, degradability and dispersal
characteristics of the hazardous substance.3 6 The second alternative
is quantitatively determined pursuant to a unit figuration.3 1 This
25. Id. § 1321(c), (f), (g), and (i).
26. Id. § 1321(b)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).
27. Id. §1321(b)(3).
28. The Coast Guard is treated throughout as the "appropriate agency." The section has
sometimes directly authorized the Coast Guard or the Secretary of the Department which
includes the Coast Guard to carry out its provisions. At other times the statute has delegated
to the President who has delegated to the Coast Guard. See, e.g., Executive Order No.
11735, 38 F.R. 21243 (1973); 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1978).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1978).
30. Id. §1321(b)(6).
31. ld. §1321(b)(2)(A).
32. Id. §1321(b)(2)(B).
33. Id. § 1321(b)(2)(B)(i).
34. Id. § 1321(b)(2)(B)(ii).
35. Id. § 1321(f). Defenses are enumerated within this subsection.
36. Id §1321(b)(2)(B)(iii)(aa). Under this alternative, the bottom line penalty is $500
with a $5000 ceiling.
37. Id. §1321(b)(2)(B)(iii)(bb). Pursuant to this alternative there is no minimum
penalty, yet the maximum bounds are $5,000,000 for vessel discharges and $500,000 for
offshore and onshore discharges.
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figuration simply directs the Administrator to establish by regulation
dollar values per each unit of hazardous substance, based upon trade
practices, guided by considerations of toxicity, degradability and dis-
persal characteristics of the hazardous substance.35
Though non-renewable substances are not subject to any removal
remedy recoverable by the federal government, action may be taken
to mitigate damage to the public health and welfare, the cost of
which will be designated a recoverable cost. 3 9 It has not been
specified just what type of discretionary action the federal govern-
ment may initiate. Presumably this would include legal action with
equitable remedies.
The Section provides a measuring stick for the imposition of
liability where oil and hazardous substances which are removable are
discharged. The concept of "harmful quantities, ' 0 as determined
by the President,4 1 is a key provision in the Section. Basically, the
discharge of "harmful quantities" of oil or hazardous substances are
prohibited except where the discharges occur on the high seas or
pursuant to other specific exemptions.4 2 The entire regulatory struc-
ture of the FWPCAA hinges upon the term "harmful quantities," as
determined by the President. The President has determined that dis-
charges of oil which cause "a film or sheen upon or discoloration of
the surface of the water" are determined to be harmful.4 3 Congress
could have prohibited all oil spills in the waters of the United
States. 4 4 But the congressional conference committee compromised
on the "harmful quantity" test. 4 I
The validity of the "sheen test" has been questioned but upheld in
the federal courts. 4 6 These decisions are based upon the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Boyd.4  In that case, a crewman
was refueling a vessel when the fuel hose was accidentally knocked
38. Id § 1321(b)(2)(B)(iv). The dollar value fixed per unit must not be less than $100 or
more than $1000.
39. Id. § 1321(b)(2)(B)(v) (1978).
40. Id. §1321(b)(3).
41. Id §1321(b)(4).
42. See generally F. CHARTER, T. SUTHERLAND & R. PONICELLI, QUANTITA-
TIVE ESTIMATES ON PETROLEUM TO THE OCEANS (1973), where it is estimated that
each year operational discharges account for 1,370,000 tons of oil, while vessel accidents
account for about 350,000 tons.
43. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1977).
44. The Senate version of the 1970 Act did prohibit all discharges, H.R. REP. No.
91-127, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2691, 2719.
45. Id. at 2722-2733.
46. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1357-1359 (W.D. Okla. 1976); United States v.
Beatty Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1040, 1043-1044 (W.D. Ky. 1975); United States v. Eureka
Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934, 942-943 (N.D. W.Va. 1975).
47. 491 F.2d 1163 (9th Cit. 1973).
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out of place and approximately thirty gallons of oil were discharged
into the water. This discharge caused a noticeable sheen upon the
surface of the water. In the prosecution for failure to report a known
oil spill occurring in "harmful quantities,"4 the court agreed with
the defendant that not all oil discharges are harmful. It established a
class of de minimus discharges to which the sanctions of the Section
do not apply.' I The court refused to take judicial notice as to the
effect of de minimus oil spills."0 It also rejected the defendant's
argument that the "sheen test" sacrifices congressional intent for ease
of application and workability. The court concluded that as a prac-
tical matter it was the most appropriate test available and that ease
of administration is not an impermissible factor in the determination
of whether the test should be applied.' I In considering the reporting
requirement,5 2 coupled with the "sheen test," the defendant's Fifth
Amendment5 ' substantive due process argument which relied on the
"void for vagueness" approach, was rejected by the court. In reject-
ing this claim, the court found that the duty to report an oil spill
which depends upon one's perception of a sheen is anything but
vague. 5 4
Although the Ninth Circuit accepted the workable standard fixed
by the President, the presumption of harmfulness of an oil spill
which causes a sheen is rebuttable.5 ' In United States v. Chevron Oil
Co.,I 6 approximately one-half to one barrel of crude oil was spilled
from Chevron's off-shore gas producing structure located in
Louisiana. Relying upon the testimony of an expert biologist in
marine life, who testified as to the effects of oil upon marine life,
Chevron established that the oil spill involved was not harmful.' I In
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1978). The predecessor statute is substantially the same.
49. 491 F.2d at 1167 (9th Cir. 1973).
50. It is quite apparent an expert witness will have to be called in order to prove the
non-harmful nature of an oil discharge which produces the regulatory sheen. Courts will not
take judicial notice of the non-harmful effects of small quantities of oil, see United States v.
Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. Ida at 1168.
52. The reporting requirement at that time was embodied within 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(4)
(1970). Presently, the requirement may be found at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1978).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
54. 491 F.2d at 1169 (9th Cir. 1973).
55. The sheen test's presumption of harmfulness is probably only rebuttable pursuant to
33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(6) (1978) and not pursuant to the penalty provision for failure to
notify the "appropriate agency" of a known oil spill pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)
(1978). See United States v. Chevron Oil Co., infra note 71, at 1364, n. 12.
56. 583 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 1360. Defendant's expert established that toxicity of oil is a function of its
quantity and concentration and a sheen does not show quantity or concentration. It should
also be noted that defendant's evidence was uncontradicted, since the government did not
produce any evidence at the hearing.
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other words, the defendant proved that although the spill resulted in
a visible sheen upon the water's surface, the spill was not "harmful."
The court rationalized its adoption of this conclusion by claiming
that the "sheen test" exceeded "the scope of congressionally dele-
gated authority." ' 8 Essentially, the Chevron case requires that at the
hearing' 5 the discharger must be permitted to offer proof that the
oil spill was de minimus. o This is not to say that an oil spill that is
cleaned up is de minimus in reference to the penalty provisions of
the FWPCAA. The determination of the non-harmful nature of the
spill is fixed at the time of the spill.6
In summary, the water pollution liability standard is expressed in
the "harmful quantity" provision and specifically applied in the
regulatory "sheen test." This "sheen test" creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that an oil spill is harmful. Hence, the basic standards are
easily articulated in terms of subsequent enforcement provisions. 6 2
Section 1321(b)(5) creates a duty on behalf of any person in
charge of vessel, or onshore or offshore facilities6 3 to immediately
report any knowledge of a discharge of oil or hazardous substances
to the appropriate agency. This subsection also provides for a crim-
inal sanction applicable to a person in charge who fails to imme-
diately notify the appropriate government agency of a discharge.6 4
Any information obtained from such a statutorily required notifica-
tion may not be used against the person in charge in any criminal
58. Id at 1363. Yet the court did not strike down the regulation since it found the test
workable and based upon scientific concepts of what quantities of oil spilled are harmful.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1978).
60. 583 F.2d at 1363 (5th Cir. 1978). The court specifically noted that its determination
that the "sheen test" creates a rebuttable presumption regarding the harmfulness of an oil
spill is specifically limited to its consideration of § 1321(b)(6) and has no application
regarding the reporting requirements of § 1321(b)(5) which may very well create an irre-
butable presumption of harmfulness; since, the creation of a rebuttable presumption would
hamper the expeditious cleanup of any oil discharge.
61. Id.; United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 839 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd without opinion, 573 F.2d 1303 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v. W. B. Enterprises,
Inc., 378 F. Supp. 420, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This is also the view of the Coast Guard
pursuant to Commandant Instruction 5922.1 IA.
62. Though the standards regarding the mechanical "sheen test" are capable of simple
application, one would hazard a guess that tracing a sheen to a particular discharger could be
difficult; this has simply not been a problem. Aside from the obvious circumstantial evi-
dence which might be utilized to identify the culprit, products identification has been as
easy as fingerprinting, Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (P.R. 1978)
(recognizing gas liquid chromatography, spectography, and atomic absorbption spectro-
photometry); United States v. Slade, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing
gas liquid chromatography).
63. Hereinafter, "vessels, onshore or offshore facilities" shall be collectively referred to
as "dischargers."
64. The penalty cannot result in imprisonment of more than one year and more than a
$10,000 fine.
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case, save a prosecution for perjury. This provision essentially creates
a "use immunity" for dischargers who notify the appropriate govern-
ment agency.
The parameters of the reporting requirement cannot be appre-
ciated without discussion of the term "person in charge." The
definitional subsection specifically defines "person" as an individual,
firm, corporation, association, or a partnership.' Despite this
straightforward definition, at least one defendant has argued that
"person" is not probative of the meaning of "person in charge. ' 6 6
The argument was simply discounted by the court hearing the case,
since the statute makes no such distinction. Therefore, a corporation
is a "person in charge" when it fails to comply with the reporting
requirements. 6 I
"Persons in charge" does not refer to everybody who participates
in the act of discharge. 6 8 The legislative history of the Section indi-
cates that Congress intended the person who is responsible for report-
ing a discharge to be the person "operationally responsible for...
the facility." 6 9 Therefore, even though a person may be guilty of a
discharge in harmful quantities,7 and liable under the automatic
civil penalty provisions, 7 ' a person will not be liable pursuant to the
notification provision7 2 unless he is "operationally responsible." 7
Notification must be immediate in order for the "use immunity"
provision to be applicable. Bare notice is not enough.7 Notification
must be made to the "appropriate agency," whose meaning has been
confused not only by the government but also by dischargers.7"
Confusion over what is the "appropriate agency" seems to have been
cured by the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Kennecott
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(7) (1978).
66. Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976).
67. Id; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 491 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
(decided under 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(4) (1970)); United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d
1124 (5th Cir. 1972) (decided under 33 U.S.C. §1161(b)(4) (1970)); United States v.
Houghland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Reynolds
Metal Co., 359 F. Supp. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
68. United States v. Mackin Constr. Co., 388 F. Supp. 478 (Mass. 1975). A seller of fuel
oil over pumped the exact order of the fuel oil ordered, causing the tank to overflow into a
nearby tributary. The seller pumper, was held not liable for a failure to report under
§ 1321(b)(5).
69. H.R. REP. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970), reprinted in [19701 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2692.
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1978).
71. Id. §1321(b)(6).
72. Id. §1321(b)(5).
73. 388 F. Supp. at 481 (Mass. 1975).
74. United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
75. United States v. Messer Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Pa. 1975). A criminal
prosecution was unsuccessful because neither party knew whether the "appropriate agency"
was the Coast Guard or the EPA.
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Copper Corp. I6 The Ninth Circuit defined "appropriate agency" as
"any federal agency concerned with water and environmental pollu-
tion on navigable waters."' This definition does not appear to be
overly broad and seems to be consistent with the goals of the federal
water pollution legislation.
Not surprisingly, the scope of the use immunity provision has been
the subject of considerable litigation. It has been held consistently
that this provision only applies to criminal cases.7 It does not pro-
vide for immunity from the "civil penalty" provisions, 79 nor from
any of the provisions of the Section.8 0 The object of the Section's
"use immunity" provision is the ancient Refuse Act. 8 ' Although the
provision is not strictly limited to exclude this particular criminal
sanction, namely a criminal fine up to $2,500 or imprisonment up to
one year or both, it was the only possible criminal liability applicable
to dischargers. 8 2
In general, the substantive provisions of § 1321(b)(5) have been
objectively interpreted. Additionally, it has been the subject of a
number of constitutional attacks. In United States v. Boyd," the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the notification requirements coupled
with the "sheen test" are not violative of due process of law. A
similar due process argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp. 8 The penalty provisions
have been strictly construed. Claims that fines are excessive8 I or that
sentencing 6 is improper have been rejected by other courts. Courts
76. 523 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1975).
77. Id. at 824.
78. United States v. Allied Towing Corp., 578 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Le Beouf Bros. Towing Co. Inc., 537 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that the
label given § 1321(b)(6) would not be controlling if the defendant was an individual with
Fifth Amendment rights, necessitating an examination of the "nature of the civil
penalties"); Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 907, 924 (S.D. N.Y.
1977); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Ward
v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (concluding that § 1321(b)(6) was
a civil penalty, regulatory in nature); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp.
1151, 1157-1163 (Conn. 1975); United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934,
937-941 (N.D. W.Va. 1975).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1978).
80. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
court stated that ".... 1321 has no criminal sanctions (except for the failure to report for
which one obviously cannot gain immunity by reporting)."
81. See note 10, supra.
82. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
83. 491 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1973).
84. 523 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1975).
85. United States v. Beatty, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1040 (W.D. Ky. 1975). The court held
that a $2,000 fine for the discharge of 10 to 15 gallons of oil was not excessive.
86. United States v. Michalopoulous, Cr. No. 61-73 (P.R. 1978). Capt. Michalopoulous
purposely lightened his grounded ship of 1.5 million gallons of crude oil.
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have had little problem analyzing the plain and simple parameters of
this paragraph.
Section 1321(b)(5) also provides that an automatic civil penalty
will be imposed upon a discharger for a per se discharge of oil in
harmful quantities.8 7 Before a valid penalty may be assessed,8 8
there must be adequate notice to the alleged discharger and an
opportunity for a hearing. The quantitative penalty assessed is also
regulated by a three factor analysis of the violation and the violator.
In determining the amount of the civil penalty, the Coast Guard shall
consider the "size of the business," the impact of the penalty on the
survival of the business, and the seriousness of the violation.8 9
In essence, the automatic civil penalty provision is a strict liability
civil penalty sanction. A substantial penalty may be assessed in the
complete absence of fault.9 0 This rule was stated most artfully in
United States v. Atlantic Richfield:
The discharges [may be] "accidental" or "unintentional," but per-
force, they violated the prohibition on discharge of (b)(3); hence,
without more, they subjected the owners (defendants) to liability
for the civil penalty under (b)(6).9 1
Although "fault" is not an element of the cause of action, it will be a
factor in assessing the quantity of the penalty administratively.' 2
The Marathon Pipe Line Co.9 offered an interesting argument
involving this issue to the Seventh Circuit. It argued that a nominal
penalty should be assessed pursuant to the strict liability application
of this provision, while a substantial penalty should be assessed
whenever there is provable negligence. The court rejected this claim,
refusing to place qualifications on a clearly written statute.9 4
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1978).
88. There is a $5000 maximum penalty capable of being assessed.
89. 33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(6). In determining the amount of the civil penalty, the Coast
Guard shall consider the "size of the business," the impact of the penalty on the survival of
the business, and the seriousness of the violation.
90. United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., No. 78-1453 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978);
United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., No. 78-1656 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978); Tug Ocean Prince,
Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 907, 924 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 836-837 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp.
1352, 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1976); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151,
1157 (Conn. 1975); United States v. Eurkea Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934, 942 (N.D.
W.Va. 1975).
91. 429 F. Supp. 830, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
92. Id. at 836. The Court points out that the Coast Guard has construed the weighing of
the "gravity of the violation" as incorporating considerations of fault.
93. United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., No. 78-1453 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978).
94. Id. A substantially similar argument was also rejected in United States v. Tex-Tow,
Inc., No. 78-1656 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978), where the discharger argued that no penalty
should be assessed where a discharger was not the actual cause of the spill. The court
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At least one court has set aside a non-nominal civil penalty when
the defendant was not at fault.9  In United States v. General Motors
Corp., the discharge occurred at defendant's abandoned manu-
facturing plant and was caused by vandals opening the valves on oil
storage tanks needed to keep the plant functional. The oil eventually
found its way to a river via a storm sewer. The court did not recog-
nize the defense of no fault, but subsequent to a de novo hearing, it
found the defendant without fault and assessed a nominal penalty.
This case has been criticized by other courts and has not been fol-
lowed. The power to grant a de novo hearing on the reassessment of
a penalty imposed by the Coast Guard has been questioned. 9 6 It is
evident that the non-nominal civil penalty imposed by the Coast
Guard in the General Motors case9" would have been upheld by
other courts considering the question. This is so because a number of
courts have held that great weight must be afforded to a Coast Guard
decision regarding penalty assessment, as long as the assessment is
rooted in substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious.' I
On only one occasion has the issue of whether the alleged dis-
charger been given sufficient statutory notice and an opportunity for
a hearing been addressed. In United States v. Independent Bulk
Transport, Inc.,9" the court was concerned that the defendant did
not know of certain damaging evidence that was included in the
hearing record. The court did not hold that the notice and hearing
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act' 0 were to be
met during proceedings pursuant to the FWPCAA. But the court did
hold that a defendant is entitled to know, address, and be heard on
material evidence and any material fact in issue.' 01
Constitutional questions premised upon the alleged denial of sub-
stantive due process under the automatic civil penalty provision have
been raised, but not successfully. The claim that the purpose of the
civil penalty is to deter oil spills by assessing a substantial civil
concluded that the argument suffered from the same defect as in the Marathon case,
namely, that it ignored the absolute nature of the civil penalty liability, as well as the
penalty's remedial and economic rather than primarily deterrent objectives.
95. United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151 (Conn. 1975).
96. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
court doubted whether it had the power to conduct a de novo hearing on the question of
penalty assessment. See also, United States v. Independent Bulk Transport, Inc., 394 F.
Supp. 1319, 1322-1323 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), where the court discusses at length a trial de novo
in the penalty assessment process.
97. 403 F. Supp. 1151 (Conn. 1975).
98. Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1350 (P.R. 1978); Matter
of Vest Transp. Co. Inc., 434 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
99. 394 F. Supp. 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
100. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-706 (1977).
101. 394 F. Supp. at 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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penalty in the absence of fault does not meet the due process re-
quirement that legislative means bear "a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose and [be] neither arbitrary nor dis-
criminatory" has been rejected.' 0 12 The strict liability civil penalty
has not only a deterrent purpose but also an economic objective. The
economic objective is achieved by shifting the cost of oil and
hazardous substance pollution to the economic sector most able to
bear it, namely, the corporate water polluter. 1 0 Additionally, the
civil penalty provision also serves the function of replenishing the re-
volving fund' 04 established by the Section. In the Atlantic Richfield
case,' ' the district court suggested that there may be some in-
stances in which there was neither fault nor third party causation
where a discharger will be able to successfully make out a substantive
due process claim.' 06
It appears that the penalty provisions of the Section have been
analyzed and interpreted by the courts in the same clear and simple
manner in which they were written. These provisions serve to further
the policy and goals found elsewhere in the FWPCAA.
CLEANUP PROVISIONS
The Section provides for government cleanup of disaster spills
which create "a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to the public
health or welfare of the United States"' 0 7 and for other spills which
the discharger does not clean up itself.' 0 8 This latter governmental
duty should not be interpreted as immunizing the discharger from
making the federal government whole for the cleanup costs incurred
by it.' 09 To effectuate these functions, the Council on Environ-
102. This is the constitutional standard articulated in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
537 (1934).
103. United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., No. 78-1453 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978);
United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., No. 78-1656 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978); United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (also rejecting defendant's
argument for entitlement to a criminal jury trial); Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352
(W.D. Okla. 1976); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151, 1157 (Conn.
1975); United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934, 942 (N.D. W.Va. 1975).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1978).
10S. 429 F. Supp. at 841-842 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
106. In United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., No. 78-1453 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 1978),
the court stated that this view was inconsistent with the same case's recognition that the
civil penalty also serves the non-deterrent purpose of financing the revolving fund.
107. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (1978).
108. Id. §1321(c)(1).
109. Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1348 (P.R. 1978). An
interpretive analogy might also be drawn from § 1321(d), where the costs incurred by the
government pursuant to that subsection are fully recoverable as a cost pursuant to
§1321(f).
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mental Quality 1" is directed to develop a National Contingency
Plan pursuant to which the EPA and the Coast Guard are authorized,
inter alia, to set up detection systems, purchase removal equipment,
and train and maintain a strike force.' ' Although this plan is re-
quired by the Section, a claim against the United States was dis-
missed when a discharger could not demonstrate specific reliance to
support his claim that he reasonably relied upon the plan and suf-
fered greater damages than necessary because of such reliance.' 12 In
addition, the United States Attorney may seek equitable relief when
there is an imminent threat of oil pollution.' 1 3
Party liability for actual costs of oil or hazardous substance re-
moval is organized within subsection (f) of the Section. The govern-
ment is entitled to recover the actual expenses incurred in the
cleaning up of an oil spill, even if the expenses are not reason-
able.' ' One court has included within the category of actual ex-
penses an award of pre-judgment interest, computed not as of the
date of the casualty, but as of the date of liquidation of damages.' I I
Subsection (f), utilizing subsection (c) as its cost guide and sub-
section (b)(3) as its basis for liability, provides that dischargers shall
be liable for the actual cleanup costs, absent specific bona fide de-
fenses. These defenses are: (a) an act of God, (b) an act of war, (c)
negligence on the part of the federal government, and (d) an act or
omission of a third party. These defenses are complete defenses when
they are singly or collectively the sole cause of the discharge.
As in Burgess v. MIV Tamano,' 1 6 a Norwegian supertanker struck
110. The President delegated his planning authority pursuant to §1321(c)(2) to the
Council on Environmental Quality (Executive Order No. 11735, Assignment of Presidential
Functions, Sec. 4 (appended to § 1321)).
111. 33 U.S.C. §1321(c)(2) (1978).
112. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 373 F. Supp. 839, 848 (Me. 1974) (one in a series of five
opinions interpreting liabilities pursuant to the predecessor of §1321, for an oil spill in
Hussey Sound off Maine's coast). Defendant's argument was that by adopting the oil con-
tingency plans, the United States made certain representations as to the availability of
cleanup capabilities (e.g., the government failed to have the personnel and equipment
necessary in the area of the spill), hence, the United States should be liable for any damages
incurred by third parties resulting from the inadequacy of the plans or from any failure to
comply with those plans.
113. 33 U.S.C. §1321(e) (1978); Cf., United States v. Ira Bushey & Sons, Inc., 161 F.
Supp. 110, 120 (Vt. 1973). The court noted that the U.S. Attorney could have proceeded
under that subsection, since there had been nine oil spills in the past five years on Lake
Champlain involving defendant's vessels.
114. United States v. Beatty, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (inter-
preting the predecessor to § 1321(0); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 983 (1st Cir.
1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978); Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F.
Supp. 1327, 1347 (P.R. 1978).
115. 456 F. Supp. at 1349 (P.R. 1978).
116. 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977).
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a submerged continental ledge off the coast of Maine, discharging
100,000 gallons of heavy oil. The owners of the supertanker charged
that the United States caused the accident through the negligent
misplacement of a marker buoy. The First Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court, finding that the buoy was not misplaced.' 1 I Therefore,
the United States could recover on its counterclaim for cleanup
costs.' 18
Different levels of liability are set for the different types of dis-
chargers.' ' 9 However, these dollar limitations are not available if the
United States can prove that a discharge was caused by the "willful
negligence" or "willful misconduct" of the discharger.'20 Com-
parable provisions of liability for responsible third parties are also
provided for within the Section.' 21
Subsection (f) also provides for the recovery of the replacement
and restoration costs of the natural resources damaged pursuant to a
discharge.' 22 The purpose of this provision is an attempt to make
the environment whole by providing a device whereby substantial
recovery can be obtained to restore every aspect of the environment.
Under certain circumstances, a discharger who can establish one of
the complete defenses may recover the cleanup expenses it incurred
from the federal government.' 23 There are four separate elements
117. See Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 435 F. Supp. 798, 804 (E.D. Va. 1977). The
district court held the United States not negligent, since any error in weather forecasting
was insufficient to establish negligence.
118. Additionally, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the compulsory pilot aboard
the tanker was a third person within the meaning of § 1321(f)(1)(D).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)(2)(3) (1978). For inland barges a limit of $125 per gross
ton, or $250,000, whichever is greater. For onshore and offshore facilities, a $50,000,000
limitation is set. But see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(q) (1978) where the limitation may be less than
$50,000,000 but greater than $8,000,000. 33 U.S.C. §1321(0(2) (1978) provides for a
potentially lesser liability for onshore facilities.
120. The terms "willful misconduct" and "willful negligence" have not been defined in
the Act. In Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1163 (2nd Cir. 1978),
the court found "willful misconduct" where the act was intentionally done with knowledge
that the performance would probably result in injury and was done in such a way as to
allow an inference of reckless disregard of the probable consequences.
121. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1978), which provides that the discharger must reimburse
the United States for its actual costs incurred in the cleanup, but that the discharger will be
subrogated to all of the rights of the United States to recover such costs against the third
party.
122. Id §1321(0(5). For an excellent analysis of the actual effect of oil upon the
environ, see Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1343-1345 (P.R.
1978), where it was proved that 92,109,720 marine animals were killed by the deliberate oil
discharge of defendant. The court utilized the lowest replacement cost at .06 per animal and
awarded a grand total of $5,526,583.20 for those specific damages.
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i) (1978). Note that this subsection provides the only possible
liability of the United States under the Section; this subsection does not provide for a
private cause of action against the United States premised on a theory of negligence, Burgess
v. M/V Tamano, 373 F. Supp. 839, 845 (Me. 1974).
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necessary for a successful claim pursuant to this provision. They are:
(1) a discharge in a harmful quantity from a facility owned by the
plaintiff; (2) a discharge not caused by the plaintiff but whose cause
is subject to one of the complete defenses; (3) the oil must be re-
moved in accordance with the regulations; and, (4) the plaintiff must
have incurred expenses in the removal of the oil.' 24 Whether or not
a facility is owned or operated by the discharger is a question of
"line drawing" to be decided by a court.'2 5 "[0] wner or operator"
has been interepreted to include the owners subrogee.' 26 The
second element to be established for a successful reimbursement
claim involves the ability to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the discharge was caused solely by one of the afore-
mentioned defenses.' 27 The third and the fourth elements are easily
established by objective evidence.
The Court of Claims is the exclusive forum chosen by Congress for
the recovery of cleanup expenses from the United States pursuant to
this provision.' This exclusivity of jurisdiction is further sup-
ported by another provision which vests the district courts of the
United States with jurisdiction for recovery of costs from the federal
government.' 29 Additionally, the revolving fund established to reim-
burse parties for their cleanup expenses 1 30 may only be used to
pay judgments rendered pursuant to this provision.' '
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS AND ISSUES
In the federal government's quest to recover its cleanup ex-
penses,' 32 may it couple such an action with alternative theories of
124. Yankee Metal Products, Inc. v. United States, 583 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
125. Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, No. 144-76 (Ct. Cl., Oct. 16, 1978).
Plaintiff attempted to recover its cleanup expenses when a railroad tank car it loaded spilled
oil at a time when it was off plaintiff's property.
126. Quarles Petroleum Co. v. United States, 551 F.2d 1201, 1207 (Ct. Cl. 1977). The
court also held that a bona fide plaintiff need only incur liability for such cleanup costs; he
need not actually incur out of pocket expenses.
127. Sabine Towing and Transp. Co. v. United States, No. 44-76 (Ct. Cl. April 27, 1978)
(holding that the definition of "Act of God" must be found in the common law); Shell Pipe
Line Corp. v. United States, No. 108075 (Ct. CL Nov. 25, 1977) (interpreting "solely" to
mean "exclusively," thereby foreclosing recovery for cleanup expenses when plaintiffs pipe-
line split, since a contributing cause was the negligent omission of plaintiff's pipeline in-
spector); Chicago, M., St. P. and Pac. R.R. v. United States, 575 F.2d 839 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(pursuant to the third party causation defense (vandal variation) a discharger could not
recover unless he proves that reasonable actions had been taken to forestall such inter-
vention by a third party).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i)(3) (1978).
129. 33 U.S.C. §1321(n) (1978).
130. Id. § 1321(k).
131. Id §1321(i). See, Gulf Refining Co. v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 300 (E.D. Tex.
1976).
132. Id. §1321(c)(1).
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recovery in order to recover its total cleanup costs? If the phrase
"notwithstanding any other provision of law'' 1 3 found in the sub-
section providing for recovery of cleanup costs incurred modifies the
language in the section that establishes liability, rather than estab-
lishes a limitation on liability, the federal government may base a
claim for cleanup expenses on other statutes or theories. However,
this view was not adopted by the court in United States v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc. ' ' The court held that the FWPCAA only provided for
full liability for cleanup costs when the discharger was "willfully negli-
gent" or "willfully [in] misconduct." The court stated that to per-
mit supplemental liability pursuant to the theories of the maritime
tort of negligence or public nuisance would allow full recovery out-
side the standards set by the Section for full recovery. This, the court
held, would be inconsistent with the FWPCAA.' 3 S
In the same district in an earlier case, the defendant/discharger
also argued the inconsistency of allowing additional cleanup re-
imbursement beyond the statutory limits. The court specifically
emphasized that the limitation of liability provisions of subsection
(f) only apply to discharges in harmful quantities.' 36 It held further
that to try and limit liability would contradict this provision,1 3 
which expressly provides that the United States may present a claim
against a contributing third party in a separate action. The court
concluded that a cause of action pursuant to the maritime tort of oil
pollution and the Refuse Act will supplement any damages to be
received for cleanup expenses.' I8 This conflict of authority within
the same district is a natural consequence of interpreting an
ambiguous section which has no specific legislative history. The
better view would be to interpret the section as providing for the
exclusive action and remedy for cleanup costs. Otherwise, the section
would be a meaningless limitation, subject to the loophole of full
liability provided judicially.
The pivotal case in the area of federal-state relations regarding the
possible federal pre-emption of state law by the FWPCAA is Askew
v. American Waterways Operators. 139 In this case, the United States
133. Id §1321(f)(1) and (3), note that no such phrase is within the second paragraph
delineating cleanup liability for a discharging onshore facility; this was apparently not an
oversight and is an example of the generally favored position shared by onshore dischargers
pursuant to the Section.
134. No. 77-2090 Section E (E.D. La. Oct. 27, 1978;as amended Feb. 7, 1979).
135. Accord, Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 435 F. Supp. 798, 808 (E.D. Va. 1977).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1978).
137. Id § 1321(h)(2) (1978).
138. United States v. M/V Big Sam, 454 F. Supp. 1144, 1154 (E.D. La. 1978).
139. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
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Supreme Court interpreted the substantially similar predecessor to
§ 132 1(o).' 40 This subsection provides, inter alia, that the Section
shall not pre-empt any state from imposing any state requirement or
state liability with respect to the discharge of oil. In interpreting the
constitutionality of this subsection, the Court squarely held that it is
within the police power of a state to recoup its cleanup expenses
pursuant to state law." ' The Court further noted that the FWPCAA
limits neither a state's causes of action for damages incurred by it nor
for damages resulting from the injury to others.' 1 2 States have
brought actions based upon their parens patriae standing,' "3 and
private individuals have brought actions based upon a whole host of
theories.' "4
The Askew ruling' 4 s reserved the questions of whether the costs a
state could recover from a discharger are limited to those specified in
the FWPCAA and whether the FWPCAA removes the pre-existing
limitations of liability found in the Limited Liability Act (LLA).' 46
In Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co.,'" 7 a barge sank causing a
substantial oil spill. The relevant damage claims involved both federal
cleanup claims' 8 and state cleanup claims,' 4' which in the ag-
gregate exceeded the limits established in the FWPCAA. Since the
negligence of the discharger was within its privity and knowledge, the
district court held, the LLA did not apply. However, the court sug-
gested that the LLA will not apply to limit cleanup costs. 1 5 0 Yet the
court did hold that the FWPCAA limitations on liability did not
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o) (1978), whose predecessor was 33 U.S.C. § 1161(o) (1970).
141. 411 U.S. at 332.
142. Id. Compare Matter of Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 321 (N.D.N.Y.
1977), where the court held that the state of New York, pursuant to its own internal law,
may not recover the costs incurred by the Coast Guard or other federal entities in cleaning
up an oil discharge since this would violate the Supremacy Clause. Similarly, it was held that
a state may only recover its compensatory damages incurred as the result of an oil discharge
caused by a federal entity. No penalty may be assessed. California v. Department of the
Navy, 371 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
143. A state may maintain an action for abatement of a public nuisance. Matter of
Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 320-321 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (collecting cases). See
also Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (P.R. 1978), where the
state had standing to sue as the trustee of the public trust in Puerto Rico for natural
resources, in addition to its capacity as parens patriae.
144. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 382 F. Supp. 351, 353 (Me. 1974). See note 18, supra.
145. 411 U.S. at 332.
146. 46 U.S.C. § § 181-189 (1958), which provides that an owner of a vessel shall not be
liable for damages incurred without his privity or knowledge to an extent greater than the
value of the interest in such vessel and its current freight.
147. 35 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1977).
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0 (1978).
149. Va. Code §62.1-44.34 (1973 Repl. Vol.).
150. 35 F. Supp. at 807 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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apply to a state claim for oil spill cleanup costs. In other words, a
state can recover these costs without limit.' I I Lastly, the court held
that the federal government's claim for cleanup costs is limited only
by the FWPCAA, regardless of the basis upon which it was made.' s2
CONCLUSION
The FWPCAA, generally, provides a comprehensive schemata of
water pollution policy, guidelines, and liabilities. Section 1321 in
particular, establishes reasonable limits on liability for oil spills.
Although the Section is a clear indication that Congress is committed
to protect our nation's waterways, it is not the best enforcement
device available for violations of federal water pollution standards.
The Refuse Act of 1899 seems to have provided the most numerous
and most effective actions in the water pollution control arena.' I I
Contrariwise, only a relative handful of prosecutions have been
brought pursuant to the Section.
With greater quantities of oil and its products being transported
annually, more prosecutions under the Section are foreseeable. It is
necessary for additional case law to develop before any valid general-
izations may be made as to the efficacy of Section 1321 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.
RICHARD L. PUGLISI
151. Id. Though there is no limit on a state for its recovery of cleanup costs, one court
has held where a vessel is involved, that the LLA will limit a state's recovery for environ-
mental claims. Matter of Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 320 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
152. 435 F. Supp. at 808 (E.D. Va. 1977).
153. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1974).
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